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Changes in retirement programs and ongoing economic, social, and health care trends raise
worrisome questions about the future financial security of American retirees. The increase in social
security’s full retirement age will reduce benefits for future retirees, and the system’s long-term
financing problems could lead to additional benefit cuts within the next few years unless
policymakers address the funding shortfall. Private-sector employers have moved away from
defined benefit (DB) pensions to defined contribution (DC) retirement plans over the past four
decades, shifting much of the responsibility for retirement saving from employers to employees
and reducing future retirement income flows for many workers (Morrissey 2016; Munnell 2014).
Falling labor supply among middle-aged men (Council of Economic Advisers 2016) and stagnant
earnings for lower- and moderate-income men (Mishel 2015) also threaten future retirement
security, because social security benefits and the capacity to save for retirement depend on lifetime
earnings. Future retirees will need more money than earlier generations, as health care costs and
indebtedness rise (Hatfield et al. 2018; Karamcheva 2013), and retirement savings must last longer
as retirees’ life expectancy grows.
Nevertheless, other economic and demographic trends are more encouraging. Women who
retire in coming decades will have worked in paid employment longer and earned more than
previous generations (Goldin and Mitchell 2017), thus accumulating more social security benefits
and retirement savings under their own names. National average wage increases will boost social
security payments for all beneficiaries, even for those with relatively low earnings. Widows are
especially likely to be impoverished (Sevak et al. 2003/2004), but the shrinking gender gap in life
expectancy (Trovato and Heyen 2006) will reduce future widowhood rates. In addition, people are
working longer than previous generations (Johnson and Wang 2017), increasing their lifetime
earnings, future social security benefits, and capacity to save for retirement.
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Given these conflicting trends, it is not surprising that there is little consensus about how
future generations will likely fare in retirement. Some studies warn of a looming retirement crisis,
predicting that in coming decades many older adults will live in or near poverty, and a majority
will be unable to maintain their preretirement living standards (Munnell et al. 2014; Rhee 2013).
Other studies are more sanguine, concluding that most people are saving adequately, and that
economic growth will boost future retirement incomes (Biggs and Schieber 2014; Butrica et al.
2012; Scholz et al. 2006).
This study uses a dynamic microsimulation model to assess retirement prospects for future
generations, with a special focus on the Millennial generation. We project future incomes to age
70, accounting for working-age outcomes that have already occurred. The analysis compares
outcomes for adults born 1980–1989, labeled Early Millennials, with outcomes for earlier cohorts.
We project inflation-adjusted per capita family income levels and the share of adults with
inadequate income, both measured at age 70. The analysis classifies age-70 income as inadequate
if it falls below 25 percent of the annual national average wage, a level we deem necessary to cover
basic needs, or if it replaces less than 75 percent of annual preretirement earnings, a commonlyassumed minimum amount needed to maintain preretirement living standards. Conversely, we
classify income that equals or exceeds 100 percent of the annual national average wage as
adequate, regardless of the replacement rate. Because the share of preretirement earnings needed
to ensure that retirees can maintain their preretirement livings standards is uncertain, we also
consider two alternative replacement rate thresholds: 60 percent and 90 percent.
Our baseline projections assume that social security will pay all benefits scheduled under
current law indefinitely. Yet the program faces a long-term financial shortfall, and social security’s
trustees project that under current benefit and revenue schedules the social security trust funds will
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run out before Early Millennials reach age 70, so that they may receive less than their full
scheduled benefits. To capture this possibility, we also model two scenarios that cut future social
security benefits.
Our results show that inflation-adjusted age-70 incomes are projected to increase over time,
yet the share of retirees with insufficient income to meet basic needs or maintain their
preretirement income standards is also projected to grow. We estimate that if scheduled social
security payments are fully paid, 38 percent of Early Millennials will have inadequate income at
age 70 based on a 75 percent replacement rate adequacy threshold, compared with 28 percent of
adults born 1937–1945. Inadequate retirement incomes are projected to be especially common
among certain groups of Early Millennials, with more than half of Hispanics and those who did
not complete high school projected to have inadequate age-70 income. Retirement security will
become even more precarious if policymakers do not increase social security’s revenues and
instead, implement across-the-board benefit cuts when the program’s trust funds run out in the
mid-2030s. We project that nearly half (49%) of Early Millennials will have inadequate income at
age 70 if policymakers fail to shore up social security’s finances.

Trends in Employment, Earnings, Wealth, and Demographic Characteristics
How Millennials fare in retirement will largely hinge on how much they earn over their
lifetime, as social security retirement benefits, DB pensions, and employer contributions to
retirement plans generally increase with earnings, and people are typically better able to save when
they earn more. Lifetime earnings, in turn, depend on how much people work and how much they
are compensated each hour.
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Labor force participation. Millennial men were less likely to participate in the labor force in their
20s and early 30s compared to previous cohorts (Johnson and Smith forthcoming). At ages 26–30,
89 percent of men born 1986–1990 participated in the labor force, compared with 96 percent in
the 1941–1945 cohort. The low participation rates for Millennials may simply reflect the high
unemployment rates that existed early in their careers, which discouraged them from looking for
work, or they may have been related to their high college attendance rates (which also may have
resulted from the poor job market). Millennial men’s market participation rates now appear to be
catching up to those of earlier recent cohorts; at age 36–40, men born 1981–1985 were just about
as likely to participate in the labor force as those born 10 years earlier. However, men born in the
early 1970s were less likely to participate in the labor force than earlier cohorts, so the fact that
Millennial men are catching up to them may not be particularly encouraging.
A more worrisome trend for future retirement security is the long-term decline in labor
supply among men in their 40s and 50s. At ages 41–45, for example, male labor force participation
rates fell from 94 percent for the 1941–1945 birth cohort, to 90 percent for the 1971–1975 birth
cohort (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). This decline has been concentrated among men with a
high school education or less, perhaps because technological change and increased globalization
reduced employer demand for low- and middle-skilled workers (Aaronson et al. 2014; Beaudry et
al. 2016; Council of Economic Advisers 2016; Juhn et al. 1991; Juhn and Potter 2006). Rising
receipt of social security disability insurance benefits and the opioid epidemic may have also
affected the rise in male labor force dropouts (Autor et al. 2016; Autor and Duggan 2003; Bound
and Burkhauser 1999; French and Song 2014; Krueger 2017). As average educational attainment
has risen over time, those who fail to complete high school are increasingly disadvantaged in
employment.
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An encouraging sign for retirement security is the recent increase in labor force
participation among older men. Men born 1951–1955 were 11 percentage points more likely to
participate in the labor force at ages 61–65 than those born 20 years earlier (Johnson and Smith
forthcoming). This recent surge reflects higher educational levels among older adults, changes in
social security rules that increase work incentives, and erosion in DB pension and retiree health
insurance coverage from private-sector employers (Friedberg and Webb 2005; Gustman and
Steinmeier 2015; Johnson et al. 2003; Mermin et al. 2007; Song and Manchester 2007).
Working longer can significantly improve the lives of older adults, especially if workers
delay social security benefit receipt until they exit the labor force. Extending the work life and
delaying retirement benefit take-up can bolster financial security at older ages (Maestas and
Zissimopoulos 2010), because adults who work longer can receive higher monthly social security
benefits, accumulate more employer-sponsored pensions, save part of their additional earnings,
and shrink the period over which their retirement savings must be spread. Working longer may
also improve health and happiness at older ages by keeping people physically and mentally active,
allowing them to maintain social networks and giving purpose to their lives (Calvo 2006). To date,
however, employment gains after age 65 have been concentrated among college graduates
(Johnson and Wang 2017). As Coile and Zhang (forthcoming) point out, recent health concerns
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic have depressed market participation among older adults
more likely than younger workers to experience serious complications if they contract COVID-19.
The pandemic appears not to have had long-lasting effects on Millennial workers, however, and
the pandemic is likely to have ended long before Millennials reach retirement age.
Millennial women’s labor force participation rates have not fallen as far behind the
participation rates of previous cohorts, as they did for their male counterparts. At age 26–30,
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female participation rates were 73 percent for the 1981–1985 cohort, compared with 76 percent
for the 1971–1975 cohort (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). Although Millennial women’s labor
force participation rates did fall in the wake of the 2007–2009 Great Recession, the downward
pressure created by the weak economy was somewhat offset by the long-term generational increase
in women’s labor supply. Among women age 31–35, for example, those in the 1981–1985 cohort
were more likely to participate in the labor force than women born before 1956. Nevertheless,
generational gains in women’s labor force participation have slowed over the past two decades
(Blau and Kahn 2007). While women’s labor supply does tend to dip when women move through
their 30s while raising children, over the past two decades there is no evidence that they are more
likely to leave the labor force to raise children (Goldin and Mitchell 2017). Women, like men, are
also lengthening their careers, working more at older ages than earlier generations (Goldin and
Katz 2016).
Earnings. Millennial men have generally earned less than men born 30 or more years earlier, but
their earnings so far are roughly comparable to those in recent cohorts (Johnson and Smith,
forthcoming). Among men age 25–29 employed full time, median annual earnings for the 1981–
1985 birth cohort were 23 percent lower than for the 1941–1945 cohort but only 5 percent lower
than for the 1971–1975 cohort. Moreover, as Millennial men moved through their 30s, they closed
and even eliminated the earnings gap.
The recent stagnation in median earnings reflects deteriorating labor market prospects for
low- and middle-skilled men. Technological advancements, increasing globalization, and
declining union membership have enhanced earnings for men in the top quarter of the earnings
distribution, even as earnings in the bottom half of the distribution fell or remained flat (Gottschalk
and Danziger 2005; Holzer and Hlavac 2012; Kopczuk et al. 2007; Mishel 2015; Rose 2016).
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Rising health care costs have also increased the share of compensation going to non-wage benefits,
suppressing growth in cash earnings (Burtless and Milusheva 2012).
Millennial women, by contrast, have generally averaged higher earnings

than previous

cohorts of women employed full time, especially after they entered their 30s (Johnson and Smith,
forthcoming). Median inflation-adjusted annual earnings for full-time workers age 30–34 and age
35–39 were higher for the 1981–1985 cohort than for any other cohort over the previous 50 years.
For women age 35–39 working full time, median earnings for the 1981–1985 birth cohort were 19
percent higher than for the 1971–1975 cohort, and 59 percent higher than for the 1931–1935
cohort.
Education. Educational trends affect future lifetime earnings because workers with a college
education generally earn more than less-educated workers and face less physically demanding
working conditions, allowing many to extend their careers. Educational attainment surged for men
born in the mid-1940s and then tapered off for men born in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Johnson
and Smith, forthcoming). Among men age 31–35, 30 percent of those born 1946–1950 had a fouryear college degree, compared with 20 percent of those born 10 years earlier and 25 percent of
those born 10 years later. The Vietnam War draft, which many men avoided with an educational
deferment, appeared responsible for the surge in college attendance for men in the 1946–1950 birth
cohort, who were 20 years old in the late 1960s (Card and Lemieux 2001). For men born 1966–
1980, the share with a four-year college degree fluctuated between 30 percent and 32 percent.
Nevertheless, the share rose to 37 percent for men born 1981–1985, and 40 percent for those born
1986–1990, who were in their early 20s during and immediately after the Great Recession and
likely pursued higher education because employment prospects were bleak (Mordechay 2017). It
remains to be seen whether the recent educational surge for men will persist.
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Among women, educational attainment has improved steadily over the past five decades.
The share of women age 31–35 with a four-year college degree increased from 9 percent for those
born 1931–1935, to 21 percent for those born 1946–1950, to 37 percent for those born 1976–1980
(Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). This trend accelerated among Millennials, with 49 percent of
women born 1986–1990 having completed college by age 31–35. Since the 1971–1975 birth
cohort, women have been more likely than men to hold a four-year college degree. Millennials’
high level of educational attainment bodes well for their future earnings and retirement security.
Marriage. Marriage is an important source of retirement security, because it allows spouses to
pool resources, insure against risks, and qualify for spouse and survivor benefits from social
security (and from employer pensions if they have them). However, the institution of marriage has
been eroding for decades for both men and women (Cherlin 2010). For men, each successive
cohort has postponed marriage later, and marriage rates for earlier cohorts plateaued in middle age
at successively lower levels (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). At age 51–55, 67 percent of men
in the 1961–1965 cohort were married, compared with 78 percent of men born 20 years earlier.
Millennial men have continued this trend. At age 36–40, 63 percent of men born 1981–1985 were
married, compared with 67 percent of men born 1971–1975, 72 percent of men born 1951–1955,
and 89 percent of men 1931–1935.
Marriage patterns are similar for women, who have increasingly delayed marriage over the
past four decades, to pursue education or careers (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). At age 26–
30, 39 percent of women born 1981–1985 were married, compared with 81 percent of women born
1941–1945. Yet the share of women who were married in middle age no longer appears to be
declining. Women in the 1981–1985 birth cohort were just as likely to be married at age 36–40 as
those in the 1971–1975 birth cohort.
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Homeownership. Homeownership is an important financial resource in retirement. Retirees can
avoid rental payments by owning a home, and homeowners may tap into their housing wealth to
supplement their retirement income. Millennials are less likely to own a home than people born
between the early 1940s and the mid-1960s. At age 31–35, only 44 percent of people born 1981–
1985 owned a home; that rate was about 10 points lower than the rate for people born 1971–1975,
1961–1965, or 1951–1955, and it was 20 points lower than for people born 1941–1945 (Johnson
and Smith, forthcoming). At age 36–40, Millennials remained 9 percentage points less likely to
own a home than people born 20 years earlier, and 18 percentage points less likely than people
born 30 years earlier.
Retirement accounts. The share of household heads and their spouses who hold a retirement
account increases with age until it reaches about 66 percent in the mid-40s (Johnson and Smith,
forthcoming). Retirement account ownership then declines somewhat after age 60, as people retire
and deplete their account holdings.
Retirement account ownership has generally increased with each successive birth cohort,
although the pattern is not a smooth one, and growth has slowed recently. At age 33–38, 58 percent
of Millennial household heads and their spouses held a retirement account, about the same
percentage as for people born in the 1960s and early 1970s (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). By
contrast, those born in the early 1970s were about 5 percentage points less likely to own a
retirement account during their 40s than their counterparts born in the late 1940s. This pattern, if
it persists, is a worrisome sign for Millennials’ retirement security.
Household debt. Household debt has grown significantly over the past quarter-century. The share
of household heads and spouses with debt has not changed much in midlife or at younger ages,
although it has fallen somewhat over the past two decades for people in their 20s, 30s, and early
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40s (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). Older Americans, however, are now more likely to hold
debt than in the past. At age 69–74, 69 percent of people born 1945–1950 held debt, compared
with 60 percent of people born 1933–1938.
Debt holdings among people with debt have risen sharply over time. At age 51–56, median
per capita outstanding debt for debt holders born 1957–1962 was 51 percent higher than for people
born 12 years earlier, and more than three times as high as for people born 24 years earlier (Johnson
and Smith, forthcoming). At age 33–38, median per capita debt was more than twice as high for
people born 1969–1974 than for people born 1957–1962. Median per capita debt levels for
Millennials were about the same as for people born in the early 1970s, well above levels for earlier
generations.
Rising housing prices, financial innovations that increased access to credit, demographic
shifts, and low and stagnating incomes spurred the rise in household indebtedness (Barba and
Pivetti 2009; Dynan and Kohn 2007). Student loan debt has also been growing over time (Brown
et al. 2014). The median debt level for debt holders declined between 2007 and 2019, but it
remained at much higher levels than in the 1990s. As people enter retirement with more debt, debt
service payments could strain their financial wellbeing (Butrica and Karamcheva 2013;
Karamcheva 2013).
Household net worth. In each generation, household net worth (the value of household assets
minus outstanding debt) grows rapidly over the life course. For people born 1957–1962, median
per capita household net worth increased from $23,600 in inflation-adjusted 2021 dollars at age
27–32, to $187,900 at age 57–62 (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). For people born in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s, household net worth increased with each successive generation. At ages 45 to
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50, for example, median per capita household net worth was 55 percent higher for people born in
the early 1960s than for those born 15 years earlier.
By contrast, household net worth has stagnated for those born in the 1970s and 1980s. For
people born in the early 1970s, median per capita household net worth has been somewhat below
the level at the same age for people born 10 years earlier (Johnson and Smith, forthcoming). At
age 33–38, median net worth for Millennials roughly equaled that for people born in the early
1960s. Sabelhaus and Volz (forthcoming) also note that household wealth has become more
unequal over time. For people born in the 1960s and 1970s, wealth in the bottom of the distribution
has declined relative to earlier cohorts.

Data and Methods
To assess retirement prospects for people born in the 1980s, we compare projections of
retirement incomes for different birth cohorts generated by our dynamic microsimulation model.
The analysis generates outcomes at the individual level, and we report all financial values in
constant 2021 dollars, adjusted by the change in the consumer price index. To do so, we use the
Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM4), a dynamic
microsimulation model designed to analyze the long-run distributional consequences of retirement
and aging issues. The model starts with a representative sample of individuals and families from
the 2004 and 2008 Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and ages them year by
year, simulating key demographic, economic, and health events. For example, DYNASIM4
projects that, each year, some people in the sample get married, have a child, or find a job. The
model projects that other people become divorced or widowed, stop working, begin collecting
social security, become disabled, or die. These transitions are based on probabilities generated by
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carefully calibrated equations estimated from nationally representative household survey data. The
equations account for differences by sex, education, earnings, and other characteristics in the
likelihood of various experiences.
Other equations in DYNASIM4 project annual earnings, savings, and home values. The
model uses program rules—combined with projections of lifetime earnings, disability status, and
household income and wealth—to project social security retirement and disability benefits and
Medicaid coverage. For consistency with social security’s projections about system finances, we
generally use the same assumptions as the social security and Medicare trustees.1
Using DYNASIM4, we project outcomes for six birth cohorts: 1937–1945 (Pre-Boomers),
1946–1954 (Early Boomers), 1955–1964 (Late Boomers), 1965–1972 (Early Gen Xers), 1973–
1979 (Late Gen Xers), and 1980–1989 (Early Millennials). The analysis compares inflationadjusted per capita family income levels and the share of adults with inadequate income, both
measured as of age 70. We focus age 70 because most people have stopped working by then. Our
income measure includes social security payments, earnings, DB pension benefits, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and other government cash benefits, plus the income stream that retirees
would receive if they annuitized 80 percent of their retirement accounts and other financial assets
under actuarially fair terms. Excluding the annuitized value of financial assets from our income
measure would understate the financial resources available to later generations of retirees, because
many employers have shifted from offering workers DB pensions that provide a steady income
stream to offering DC retirement plans whose balances are rarely annuitized (Lockwood 2012;
Smith et al. 2009). We divide family income by two for married adults to create a per capita
measure.
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As noted above, we classify age-70 income as inadequate if it is less than 25 percent of the
annual national average wage, or if it replaces less than 75 percent of annual preretirement earnings
received from age 50–59, a commonly assumed minimum amount needed to maintain
preretirement living standards (T. Rowe Price 2019). The replacement rate needed to maintain
preretirement living standards is deemed less than 100 percent because retirees do not generally
pay payroll taxes or save for retirement, and expenses usually fall after children leave the home.
Of course how much income retirees actually need is uncertain, and low-income people who do
not save much for retirement or pay much in taxes when they are working may need more than 75
percent of their preretirement earnings to maintain their living standards (Benz 2010). To test the
sensitivity of our adequacy estimates to our replacement rate threshold, we also consider two
alternative replacement rates: 60 percent and 90 percent.
Social security’s long-term financing gap complicates our income projections. The social
security trustees’ 2022 intermediate projections indicate that the program will be able to finance
full benefits under existing revenue forecasts only until 2035 (Social Security Trustees 2022), 15
years before the oldest Millennials reach age 70. Unless the system receives additional revenue,
the Trustees project that the program will be able to pay only about 75 percent of scheduled
benefits in later years. Our analysis considers three scenarios about future social security payments.
We focus first on the scheduled benefits scenario, which assumes policymakers will replenish the
program’s revenue so that retirees receive the full payments provided under the existing benefit
formula. Next, because policymakers’ response to social security’s financial problems is uncertain,
we also consider two alternative scenarios. The payable benefits scenario assumes that the program
receives no additional financing, and benefits are cut across the board to close the financing gap
once social security’s trust fund is depleted. The balanced benefits scenario assumes that Congress
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implements a balanced reform that closes half the financing shortfall through benefit cuts and half
through revenue increases.2

Results
The model projects that per capita family income at age 70 will increase over time (see
Table 1). Average age-70 income is projected to reach $80,300 for Early Millennials in 2021
inflation-adjusted dollars, 35 percent higher than the $59,400 average for Pre-Boomers and 23
percent higher than the $65,400 for Late Boomers. While overall incomes rise, there is also much
heterogeneity. For Early Millennials, projected age-70 income ranges from $16,200 at the 10th
percentile and $28,100 at the 25th percentile to $90,100 at the 75th percentile and $154,700 at the
90th percentile.
Table 1 here
Income sources. The projected composition of age-70 income varies across income levels (see
Table 2). Social security accounts for about three-quarters of total income in the bottom income
quintile and about one-half of income in the middle income quintile. In the top income quintile,
however, it accounts for less than one-fifth of income. For Early Millennials, after claiming social
security, income from assets and labor earnings are the most important income sources for older
adults in the bottom and middle income quintiles. In the top income quintile, labor earnings
account for more income than any other source, followed closely by income from assets. Social
security is the third most important income source in the top income quintile.
Table 2 here
Our model also projects that mean age-70 income will grow somewhat more rapidly for
higher-income people than for lower-income people. Over the roughly 45 years that separate the
Pre-Boomers and the Early Millennials, projected mean income will rise 26 percent in the bottom
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income quintile, 31 percent in the middle income quintile, and 39 percent in the top income
quintile. Growth differences are starker when we consider income levels, with mean income rising
$3,000 in the bottom income quintile and $62,300 in the top quintile.
Income sources are also shifting. The importance of labor earnings at older ages is
projected to rise, especially for older adults near the top of the income distribution, while the
importance of DB pensions falls. SSI benefits also decline, with participation rates falling because
the program does not index eligibility thresholds for income growth or inflation (Favreault 2021).
We project that SSI accounts for 9 percent of income for Pre-Boomers in the bottom income
quintile, compared with only 3 percent for Early Millennials.
Income differences by demographic characteristics. Age-70 projected incomes are also rising
for men, non-Hispanic white adults, married adults, and people with a college education, more
than for women, people of color, single adults, and people who did not attend college (see Table
3). Yet many of these projected differentials are likely to narrow over the coming decades, as
retirement incomes grow rapidly for people of color and women, reflecting lifetime earnings gains
for these groups. Comparing Pre-Boomers and Early Millennials, we project that median age-70
income will increase 97 percent for Hispanic adults and 63 percent for Black adults, but only 33
percent for white adults. Consequently, the median income advantage for non-Hispanic white
adults relative to Hispanic adults will fall from 175 percent among Pre-Boomers to 87 percent for
Early Millennials, and the advantage for non-Hispanic white adults relative to Black adults will
fall from 78 percent to 46 percent. We project that median age-70 income for women will be 40
percent higher among Early Millennials than Pre-Boomers, whereas median income for men will
be only 23 percent higher among Early Millennials. Anticipated strong income growth for women
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will shrink men’s income advantage from 22 percent among Pre-Boomers to only 8 percent among
Early Millennials.
Table 3 here
Nevertheless, projected age-70 income differentials by lifetime earnings will also grow
over time. For people in the top quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution, median age-70
income will be 51 percent higher among Early Millennials than Pre-Boomers. Median age-70
income across the six generations will grow only 22 percent for people in the middle lifetime
earnings quintile and only 31 percent for people in the bottom lifetime earnings quintile. This
differential largely reflects ongoing growth in earnings inequality, as earnings increase more
rapidly near the top of the earnings distribution than in the middle or near the bottom (Piketty and
Saez 2003).
Income adequacy at older ages. the anticipated rise in age-70 income over time, the share of
older adults unable to cover basic needs or maintain their preretirement living standards is also
projected to grow. Defining inadequate income at age 70 as income that falls below 25 percent of
the annual national average wage or that falls below 75 percent of average annual earnings received
at age 50–59 (unless age-70 income equals or exceeds the annual national average wage), we
project that age-70 income will be inadequate for 38 percent of Early Millennials, versus 28 percent
of Pre-Boomers and Early Boomers, and 30 percent of Late Boomers (see Table 4). These
estimates assume that social security continues to pay full scheduled benefits after the program’s
trust fund runs out in 2035 (Social Security Trustees 2022), before Early Gen Xers, Late Gen Xers,
and Early Millennials reach age 70. Therefore the projected share of older adults with inadequate
income increases over time, as retirement incomes will grow more slowly than labor market
earnings.

17
Table 4 here
Inadequate retirement income is especially prevalent for people of color, people who did
not attend college, people who never marry, and people with limited lifetime earnings. We project
that, among Early Millennials, 53 percent of Hispanic adults, 42 percent of Black adults, 66 percent
of people who did not complete high school, 45 percent of people with no more than a high school
diploma, and 50 percent of people who never marry, will have inadequate income to meet basic
needs at age 70 or maintain their preretirement living standards. Additionally, 64 percent of people
in the bottom quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution are projected to have inadequate income
at age 70. Even relatively privileged groups face a meaningful financial risk at older ages. We
project that 28 percent of Early Millennials with a four-year college degree and 23 percent of those
in the top quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution will lack an adequate income at age 70.
Although we project that financial security in retirement will deteriorate for nearly all
demographic groups, certain Early Millennial groups will not face much more financial risk
compared to their Pre-Boomer counterparts. Thus the projected share of Early Millennials
receiving inadequate income at age 70 is only 7 percentage points higher among Black adults and
a few percentage points lower among Hispanic adults and other nonwhite adults. The share with
inadequate income is forecasted to rise only 4 percentage points for widowed adults, 7 percentage
points for divorced adults, and 6 percentage points for adults in the top quintile of the lifetime
earnings distribution.
Impact of social security’s financing gap. Thus far, the retirement income projections assume
that policymakers will find the additional revenues to pay social security scheduled benefits. Next
we examine both the payable scenario, which assumes across-the-board benefit cuts when the trust
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funds run out, and the balanced scenario which splits the difference between cutting benefits and
raising payroll taxes.
Under these assumptions, the projected share of Early Millennials with insufficient income
at age 70 to meet basic needs or maintain their preretirement living standards will increase to 43
percent under the balanced scenario and 49 percent under the payable scenario (see Table 5). Under
the payable scenario, 53 percent of Black adults in the Early Millennial cohort, 62 percent of
Hispanic adults, 75 percent of adults who did not complete high school, 57 percent of adults with
only a high school diploma, and 74 percent of adults in the bottom quintile of the lifetime earnings
distribution will receive inadequate retirement income.
Table 5 here
Sensitivity to the definition of adequate income. Our projections of income adequacy also
depend on the share of earnings that retirees are assumed to need to maintain their preretirement
living standards. Thus far, we have assumed a replacement rate of 75 percent. Yet when the
replacement rate is cut to 60 percent, the projected share of Early Millennials with inadequate
retirement income falls from 38 percent to 29 percent (see Table 6). When we increase the required
replacement rate to 90 percent, the share with inadequate income rises to 46 percent. Under all of
these replacement rate assumptions, the projected share of financially insecure retirees is
substantially higher for the Early Millennial cohort than for the Pre-Boomer cohort.
Table 6 here
Although the projected share of adults with inadequate retirement income at age 70 is
sensitive to the replacement rate assumption, the replacement rate has little impact on projected
income adequacy for adults near the top and bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution. Increasing
the replacement rate threshold from 60 percent to 90 percent changes the share of Early Millennials
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in the bottom quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution projected to have inadequate retirement
income by only 2 percentage points, and the share in the top lifetime earnings quintiles with
inadequate income increases only 8 percentage points. Many people with limited lifetime earnings
are projected to have inadequate retirement income because their annual income falls below 25
percent of the annual national average wage, not because their projected replacement rate is too
low. Many people with substantial lifetime earnings are projected to have adequate income
because their income equals or exceeds 100 percent of the annual national average wage, not
because they can replace a substantial portion of their preretirement earnings.

Conclusions
Our analysis combine data from multiple high-quality sources to project how various trends
in demographics, employment, earnings, savings, and other factors might play out over the next
40 years to shape future retirement incomes.
Projections show that median age-70 income will be higher for Early Millennials than
previous generations, but this group still faces a higher risk of lacking sufficient retirement income
to meet basic needs or maintain preretirement living standards. Classifying age-70 income as
inadequate if it falls below 25 percent of the annual national average wage or if it replaces less
than 75 percent of annual preretirement earnings (unless it equals or exceeds 100 percent of the
annual national average wage), we project that 38 percent of Early Millennials will have
inadequate age-70 income, compared with 28 percent of Pre-Boomers (born 1937–1945) and 30
percent of Late Boomers (born 1955–1964). Retirement security is projected to be especially
precarious for Early Millennials of color, those with little education and limited lifetime earnings,
and those who are not married.
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These projections assume that social security will pay scheduled social security benefits .
Yet because social security faces a long-term financing shortfall, benefits may be cut by one
quarter, in which case we project that 48 percent of Early Millennials will have inadequate income
at age 70.
Retirement is still more than two decades away for Americans born in the 1980s, and their
old age financial security will hinge on several factors that have yet to play out. The future course
of stock market returns, interest rates, housing prices, and inflation will affect future retirement
incomes. How long people work, which depends partly on how health trajectories evolve, will
surely help determine financial security for future retirees. How rapidly future wages grow will
also shape future retirement security. Wage growth will depend on labor productivity which will
likely continue to rise, although perhaps more slowly than in the past (Fernald 2016; Gordon 2014).
Another consideration is that the relationship between wage growth and labor productivity growth
has been weakening over time, reducing the share of the nation’s output that goes to labor. In the
past decade, productivity in the non-farm-business sector increased 12.3 percent, while real labor
compensation grew only 5.1 percent (Solow 2015). Declining unionization, the shift from labor to
capital, and rising employer health care costs may explain why wages have not been keeping pace
with productivity growth (Ginsburg 2014; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013).
Rising out-of-pocket spending on health care and long-term services and supports pose an
additional threat to future retirees’ financial security. Although Medicare covers nearly all older
adults, out-of-pocket spending on Medicare premiums, premiums for supplemental private
insurance, copays, and uncovered services can be financially burdensome. Hatfield et al. (2018)
projected that the median share of income that adults age 65+ medical care spending will grow
from 10 to 14 percent between 2012 and 2030. Fronstin and VanDerhei (2017) estimated that a
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65-year-old man would require $127,000 in savings to be 90 percent certain of covering all future
medical expenses, and a 65-year-old woman would need $143,000 (exclusive of long term care
costs). Spending on long-term services and supports, which include nursing home care, residential
care, and home care, can be even more burdensome for families because relatively few people
have private long-term care insurance, Medicare does not usually cover them, and Medicaid pays
only for people who have already depleted virtually all their wealth. Favreault and Dey (2015)
projected that people turning 65 today would need $36,000 by age 65 to cover expected lifetime
out-of-pocket costs for intensive long-term services and supports, and about 1 in 10 will need to
set aside more than $100,000. Our projection model, DYNASIM4, now projects out-of-pocket and
third-party spending on medical care and long-term services and supports, and future analyses will
incorporate these estimates into our studies of retirement income adequacy.
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Endnotes
1

For more information about DYNASIM4 and an earlier version of the model, see Urban Institute

(2015) and Favreault et al. (2015).
2

We model the balanced benefit scenario after a social security reform proposal developed by the

Bipartisan Policy Center’s Commission on Retirement Security and Personal Savings (Bipartisan
Policy Center 2016). That proposal would increase social security revenues by increasing the
payroll tax rate, raising the maximum taxable earnings level, and increasing taxes on benefits for
higher-income beneficiaries, and it would cut benefits by indexing the retirement age to longevity,
capping the spousal benefit, reducing cost-of-living adjustments, and cutting benefits for higher
income beneficiaries. The proposal would also increase payments to lower-income beneficiaries
by establishing a basic minimum benefit and enhancing survivor benefits. The commission
projected that social security would attain long-range solvency if the proposal had been
implemented in 2016, but not if implemented later. We revised the proposal to include more
revenue for social security and additional benefit cuts so that it would achieve long-range solvency
if implemented in 2023.
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Table 1. Projected mean and distribution of per capita annual family income at age 70 by birth
cohort ($)
Percentile of
distribution
Mean
Percentile of the
distribution
10th
25th
50th (median)
75th
90th

PreBoomers
59,400

Early
Boomers
61,800

12,000
20,800
38,800
70,100
116,500

13,200
23,200
42,400
76,500
126,600

Late
Early
Late
Boomers Gen Xers Gen Xers
65,400
71,700
73,500

13,300
22,800
42,100
77,300
132,800

14,000
23,900
43,500
81,100
138,000

14,400
25,100
45,600
84,600
149,400

Early
Millennials
80,300

16,200
28,100
50,700
90,100
154,700

Notes: Estimates are rounded to the nearest $100 and expressed in 2021 inflation-adjusted
dollars. The analysis assumes that scheduled social security benefits are paid in full. The income
measure includes social security, earnings, DB pensions, SSI, other government cash benefits,
and the annual income from an actuarially fair annuity valued at 80 percent of financial assets,
including retirement accounts. The analysis divides total family income by two for married
adults.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.
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Table 2. Projected annual per capita family income at age 70 by birth cohort, income source, and
income quintile
Pre-Boomers
Mean
% of
($)
Total
Bottom Quintile
Social Security
Labor Market
Assets
DB Pension
SSI
Other income
Total
Middle quintile
Social Security
Labor Market
Assets
DB Pension
SSI
Other income
Total
Top quintile
Social Security
Labor Market
Assets
DB Pension
SSI
Other income
Total

Early Millennials
Mean
% of
($)
Total

Change
Mean
($)

%

8,700
400
700
500
1,100
200
11,600

75
3
6
4
9
2
100

10,900
900
1,900
200
400
300
14,600

75
6
13
1
3
2
100

2,200
500
1,200
-300
-700
100
3,000

25
125
171
-60
-64
50
26

17,400
4,400
7,700
7,900
0
1,200
38,800

45
11
20
20
0
3
100

27,100
7,100
12,200
2,100
0
2,300
50,800

53
14
24
4
0
5
100

9,700
2,700
4,500
-5,800
0
1,100
12,000

56
61
58
-73
na
92
31

20,400
37,300
61,800
28,100
0
12,000
159,500

13
23
39
18
0
8
100

37,000
82,100
73,200
11,200
0
18,400
221,800

17
37
33
5
0
8
100

16,600
44,800
11,400
-16,900
0
6,400
62,300

81
120
18
-60
na
53
39

Notes: Estimates are rounded to the nearest $100 and expressed in 2021 inflation-adjusted
dollars. The analysis assumes that scheduled social security benefits are paid in full. See the
notes to Table 1 for details on the income measure.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.
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Table 3. Projected median annual per capita family income at age 70 by birth cohort and
personal characteristics ($)

All
Gender
Men
Women
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school
diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Four-year college
degree or more
Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Quintile of lifetime
earnings
Bottom
Second
Third
Fourth
Top

PreBoomers
38,800

Early
Boomers
42,400

Late
Early
Late
Boomers Gen Xers Gen Xers
42,100
43,500
45,600

Early
Millennials
50,700

42,900
35,100

45,000
40,500

45,000
39,900

46,600
41,200

46,800
44,500

52,700
49,000

44,900
25,200
16,300
31,000

49,000
29,700
19,700
33,300

49,400
29,900
21,500
39,300

53,800
34,100
22,100
47,200

55,300
33,800
25,000
60,000

59,900
41,000
32,100
59,900

17,600
32,200
45,600

16,600
31,600
42,800

16,200
30,500
44,500

15,300
29,700
44,000

15,100
30,400
45,800

17,600
34,300
47,500

74,700

74,700

81,000

80,900

82,500

79,900

43,000
27,900
33,200
25,700

47,500
35,400
35,100
31,000

48,800
35,800
34,500
27,700

50,200
35,400
37,400
27,200

52,900
39,800
38,200
28,500

56,600
47,700
45,500
37,000

13,400
25,200
40,500
53,800
86,900

14,700
28,500
42,700
61,900
98,200

14,400
27,100
40,900
61,700
110,000

14,900
27,400
42,300
65,300
113,400

15,500
28,600
43,200
68,200
127,500

17,600
33,200
49,600
73,300
131,400

Notes: Estimates are rounded to the nearest $100 and expressed in 2021 inflation-adjusted
dollars. The analysis assumes that scheduled social security benefits are paid in full. The income
measure includes social security, earnings, DB pensions, SSI, other government cash benefits,
and the annual income from an actuarially fair annuity valued at 80 percent of financial assets,
including retirement accounts. The analysis divides total family income by two for married
adults. The lifetime earnings measure includes annual earnings of spouses in year when married,
and only one earnings in years when single.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.
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Table 4. Projected percentage of adults with inadequate income at age 70 by birth cohort and
personal characteristics

All
Gender
Men
Women
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school
diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Four-year college
degree or more
Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Quintile of lifetime
earnings
Bottom
Second
Third
Fourth
Top

PreBoomers
28

Early
Boomers
28

Late
Boomers
30

Early
Gen Xers
35

Late
Gen Xers
39

Early
Millennials
38

29
27

28
28

29
31

33
37

38
40

38
39

23
35
54
37

23
35
50
37

25
37
48
35

29
39
54
35

32
45
56
33

33
42
53
34

49
31
23

54
31
27

54
35
27

64
42
32

70
46
36

66
45
38

14

17

19

22

26

28

26
29
33
39

25
26
33
41

27
28
35
43

32
32
38
51

35
34
40
55

35
33
40
50

50
24
23
25
17

53
25
25
22
16

61
28
25
24
15

65
34
32
28
18

67
37
36
34
19

64
35
35
36
23

Notes: We classify adults as having inadequate income if their age-70 income falls below 25% of
the annual average national wage or if they are unable to replace at least 75% of the average
amount they earned from age 50–59 (unless their age-70 income equals or exceeds the annual
average national wage). The analysis assumes that scheduled social security benefits are paid in
full. See the notes to Table 3 for details on the income and lifetime earnings measures.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.
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Table 5. Projected percentage of Pre-Boomers and Early Millennials with inadequate income at
age 70 under alternative scenarios about how social security benefits will be paid after the trust
funds run out, by personal characteristics

All
Gender
Men
Women
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Four-year college degree
or more
Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Quintile of lifetime earnings
Bottom
Second
Third
Fourth
Top

Pre-Boomers
All
Scenarios
28

Early Millennials
Scheduled
Payable
Scenario
Scenario
38
49

Balanced
Scenario
43

29
27

38
39

47
50

43
44

23
35
54
37

33
42
53
34

44
53
62
42

38
46
56
39

49
31
23

66
45
38

75
57
50

68
50
43

14

28

36

33

26
29
33
39

35
33
40
50

46
45
49
59

43
33
41
50

50
24
23
25
17

64
35
35
36
23

74
50
46
45
29

64
41
41
43
28

Notes: The scheduled scenario assumes all social security benefits currently scheduled will be
paid after the trust funds run out, the payable scenario assumes that only benefits that can be
financed under existing revenue streams will be paid, and the balanced scenario assumes that
half the financing shortfall will be closed through benefit cuts and half will be closed through
revenue increases. We classify adults as having inadequate income if their age-70 income falls
below 25% of the annual average national wage or they are unable to replace at least 75% of the
average amount they earned from age 50–59 (unless their age 70 income equals or exceeds the
annual average national wage). See the notes to Table 1 for details on the income and lifetime
earnings measures.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.
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Table 6. Projected percentage of Pre-Boomers and Early Millennials with inadequate income at
age 70 under alternative adequacy measures, by personal characteristics

All
Gender
Men
Women
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school
diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Four-year college
degree or more
Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Quintile of lifetime
earnings
Bottom
Second
Third
Fourth
Top

75%
Replacement Rate
PreEarly
Boomer Millennial
28
38

60%
Replacement Rate
PreEarly
Boomer Millennial
21
29

90%
Replacement Rate
PreEarly
Boomer Millennial
34
46

29
27

38
39

22
21

29
30

34
34

45
47

23
35
54
37

33
42
53
34

16
29
49
30

23
34
45
25

29
41
58
43

41
50
59
42

49
31
23

66
45
38

43
22
17

64
37
26

55
39
29

70
53
48

14

28

9

18

17

35

26
29
33
39

35
33
40
50

19
21
27
34

25
25
33
42

32
35
39
42

45
39
46
55

50
24
23
25
17

64
35
35
36
23

48
17
14
16
13

64
26
20
21
17

52
33
32
33
20

66
46
47
48
25

Notes: We classify adults as having inadequate income if their age-70 income falls below 25%
of the annual average national wage or the ratio of their age-70 income to the average annual
earnings they received from age 50–59 falls below the specified threshold (unless their age-70
income equals or exceeds the annual average national wage). The analysis assumes that
scheduled social security benefits will be paid in full. See the notes to Table 1 for details on the
income and lifetime earnings measures.
Source: Authors’ calculations using DYNASIM4 runid999.

